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WHO CAN DEFEND A FEDERAL REGULATION? THE
NINTH CIRCUIT MISAPPLIED RULE 24 BY DENYING
INTERVENTION OF RIGHT IN KOOTENAI TRIBE OF
IDAHO V. VENEMAN
Stephanie D. Matheny
Abstract: In Kootenai Tribe of Idaho v. Veneman, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit misapplied Rule 24 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure by denying
intervention of right to organizations that had protectable interests in the adoption and
implementation of the Roadless Rule. The court based its decision to deny intervention of
right on its federal defendant rule, which bars intervention of right by parties other than the
federal government to defend a challenge brought under the National Environmental Policy
Act (NEPA). The Kootenai decision extended the reach of the federal defendant rule to
include environmental organizations that had actively participated in the challenged NEPA
administrative rulemaking process. This extension contradicts Rule 24's focus on the
practical effects of litigation and the Ninth Circuit's precedent of liberally granting
intervention in public law cases. This Note argues that the Ninth Circuit should abandon the
federal defendant rule and instead apply Rule 24 by individually evaluating whether
absentees have a protectable interest within NEPA's zone of concern for the environment or
have actively participated in the process of adopting the challenged regulation.

In January 2001, the United States Forest Service issued its final
Roadless Rule,' a landmark conservation regulation that would prohibit
nearly all logging and roadbuilding in 58.5 million acres of National
Forest lands.2 The Roadless Rule was the culmination of a lengthy
administrative rulemaking process 3 undertaken pursuant to the National
Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA).4 The Forest Service
received over one million public comments on the Roadless Rule,
ninety-six percent of which called for strong conservation measures. 5
The Clinton administration adopted the Roadless Rule just two weeks
before the inauguration of President George W. Bush.6 When opponents
filed a NEPA challenge in the District Court of Idaho seeking to
1. Roadless Area Conservation, 66 Fed. Reg. 3244 (Jan. 12, 2001) (to be codified at 36 C.F.R. pt.
294).
2. Kootenai Tribe of Idaho v. Veneman, 313 F.3d 1094, 1105-06 (9th Cir. 2002) [hereinafter
Kootenai 11].
3. Id. at 1104-05.
4. Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (1970) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4375
(2000)).
5. Kootenaill,313 F.3d at 1116 n.19, 1119.
6. Id. at 1105-06.
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overturn the Roadless Rule, the new administration announced that it
had its own concerns about the Roadless Rule and declined to defend it
in court. In response, several environmental organizations sought to
intervene under Rule 24 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to
defend the NEPA challenge.8 The District Court of Idaho alternatively
granted both intervention of right and permissive intervention, 9 but later
rejected the arguments of the environmental intervenors by concluding
that the Forest Service had likely violated NEPA 0 and temporarily
enjoined implementation of the Roadless Rule."
In Kootenai Tribe of Idaho v. Veneman,' 2 the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit concluded that the environmental organizations
could not intervene of right under Rule 24(a)(2) to defend a federal
regulation even though they had helped to promulgate it. 13 The court
applied its federal defendant rule, reasoning that because the federal
government is the only party capable of violating NEPA, no other
14
entities have the right to intervene to defend a NEPA challenge.
Instead, the court held that district courts have discretion to grant
defendant-side intervention in NEPA cases under Rule 24(b)(2)'s
standards for permissive intervention. 15 The Ninth Circuit then affirmed
the district court's grant of permissive intervention and reached the
merits of the intervenors' defense of the Roadless Rule.' 6 Ultimately, the
Ninth Circuit agreed with the arguments presented by the environmental
intervenors and lifted the injunction that had blocked implementation of
the Roadless Rule. 17 Although the Kootenai case was at least a

7. Id. at 1106, 1111.
8. Id. at 1106.
9. Kootenai Tribe of Idaho v. Veneman, No. CVO1-10-N-EJL (D. Idaho Mar. 14, 2001) (order

granting intervention).
10. Kootenai Tribe of Idaho v. Veneman, 142 F. Supp. 2d 1231, 1246-47 (D. Idaho 2001)
[hereinafter Kootenai 1].
11. Kootenai 1, 313 F.3d at 1106-07.
12. 313 F.3d 1094 (9th Cir. 2002).
13. See id. at 1104-05.

14. Id. at 1108. This Note will use the term "federal defendant rule" to denote the Ninth Circuit's
rule barring defendant-side intervention in NEPA cases by parties other than the federal
government. See PortlandAudubon Society v. Hodel, 866 F.2d 302, 308-09 (9th Cir. 1989), for a
detailed discussion of the federal defendant rule.
15. Kootenai 1, 313 F.3d at 1111.
16. See id. at 1104.

17. id.
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temporary victory for the Roadless Rule, 18 this win might have come at a
high cost: leaving defendant-side intervention in NEPA cases to the
discretion of district courts may limit the ability of absentees to protect
their interests in future government decisions.' 9
The Kootenai case is a prominent example of a recent litigation trend
in which parties opposed to conservation-oriented plans and endangered
species protections have used NEPA 20 and other federal environmental
statutes 2 1 to challenge these programs in court. This reverse form of
conservation litigation, which seeks to achieve primarily economic goals
using environmental statutes to provide the cause of action, 22 can be a
particularly effective method to overturn regulations that were adopted
by a previous administration but are at odds with the policies of a new
administration.2 3 The new administration might decline to defend a
regulation promulgated by its predecessor, and may find it politically
expedient to accede to an "adverse" court judgment or settle a case
rather than independently undertake a public rulemaking process to
change the regulation.24
Intervention under Rule 24 provides an opportunity for public interest
organizations to protect regulations that the federal government adopts
18. Despite the Ninth Circuit's decision, the future of the Roadless Rule remains uncertain
because another federal court issued a contradictory opinion holding that the Forest Service had
violated NEPA and enjoining the rule nationwide. See State of Wyo. v. United States Dep't of
Agric., No. 01-CV-86-B, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15514, *112-14 (July 14, 2003). Agriculture
Secretary Ann Veneman announced that the Forest Service will retain the Roadless Rule, but with
likely modifications to give more control to states and to exempt large tracts in Alaska. Press
Release, USDA Retains National Forest Roadless Area Conservation Rule, USDA News Release
No. 0200.03 (June 9, 2003), available at http://www.usda.gov/news/releases/2003/06/0200.htm (last
visited Oct. 23, 2003).
19. The Ninth Circuit has already applied the Kootenai rule to deny intervention of right to
conservation groups seeking to defend a NEPA challenge to forest rules in Alaska. Alaska Forest
Ass'n v. United States Dep't of Agric., No. 01-35549, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 10880, at *3 (9th Cir.
May 29, 2003).
20. See, e.g., id. at *2-3 (applying the Kootenai rule to deny intervention of right to conservation
groups seeking to appeal a district court decision finding that the government had violated NEPA
when the government elected not to appeal); Wyoming v. United States Dep't of Agric., 201 F.
Supp. 2d 1151, 1153 (D. Wyo. 2002) (challenging the Roadless Rule for NEPA and other
procedural violations).
21. See, e.g., Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 157 (1997) (challenging a biological opinion issued
pursuant to the Endangered Species Act).
22. See, e.g., id.
23. See, e.g., W. Council of Indus. Workers v. Sec'y of the Interior, Civ. No. 02-6100-AA (D. Or.
Apr. 22, 2003) (settling of industry lawsuit challenging the status and critical habitat designation of
the northern spotted owl).
24. See id.
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but later chooses not to defend in court. 25 Intervenors become parties to
the litigation.26 They can submit briefs, examine witnesses at trial, and
appeal adverse decisions. 27 Absentees 28 may intervene of right under
Rule 24(a)(2) when they have a protectable interest in the subject matter
of the suit that may be adversely affected by the outcome of the case and
that is not adequately represented by the existing parties. 29 Alternatively,
courts may grant permissive intervention under Rule 24(b)(2) if
absentees assert an independent basis for federal court jurisdiction and
raise claims that share common questions of law or fact with issues in
the litigation. 30 Rule 24 is a flexible and practical rule3 intended to
protect absentees whose interests might be affected by the outcome of
pending litigation.32
This Note argues that the Ninth Circuit misapplied Rule 24 in
Kootenai by denying intervention of right to groups with protectable
interests in defending the Roadless Rule. The Ninth Circuit's federal
defendant rule contravenes Rule 24(a)(2)'s requirement that courts
assess the practical effects of litigation on the protectable interests of
absentees, 33 including the stare decisis effect of overturning a federal
regulation.34 This Note proposes that absentees satisfy the protectable
interest requirement of Rule 24(a)(2) by asserting injuries within
NEPA's zone of interest for the environment and by actively
participating in the rulemaking process. If they satisfy the other
requirements of the rule, they have a right to intervene. Part I briefly
reviews the function and environmental purpose of NEPA and
introduces the zone of interest test under the Administrative Procedure
25. See id. (noting that the court had granted intervention to environmental groups to defend
endangered species status and critical habitat designations for spotted owls and marbled murrelets).
26. See Stringfellow v. Concerned Neighbors in Action, 480 U.S. 370, 375 (1987).

27. See id.
28. As used in this paper, absentees are entities or individuals who are not original parties to
litigation.
29. FED. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2).
30. Id. 24(b)(2).
31. See, e.g., Northwest Forest Res. Council v. Glickman, 82 F.3d 825, 837 (9th Cir. 1996)
(noting that Rule 24's interest requirement is a "practical, threshold inquiry" and that "no specific
legal or equitable interest need be established").
32. Kleissler v. United States Forest Serv., 157 F.3d 964, 971 (3d Cir. 1998).
33. FED. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2).

34. See, e.g., Oneida Indian Nation of Wis. v. New York, 732 F.2d 261, 265 (2d Cir. 1985)
(granting intervention of right to an absentee tribe whose aboriginal land rights could be affected by
the stare decisis effect ofajudgment in the case).
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Act (APA).3 5 Part II describes intervention under Rule 24, focusing on
the protectable interest requirement for intervention of right as
interpreted by the U.S. Supreme Court, its application to public law
cases, and its relationship to the requirements for Article III standing.36
Part III describes the federal defendant rule for NEPA cases and reviews
Ninth Circuit public law intervention cases in non-NEPA contexts. Part
IV reviews the Kootenai decision. Finally, Part V argues that the Ninth
Circuit should have allowed the environmental groups to intervene of
right under Rule 24(a)(2), and that the court should abandon the federal
defendant rule in NEPA challenges in favor of a practical and flexible
inquiry into the asserted interests of the proposed intervenors as
mandated by Rule 24.
1.

NEPA: A PROCEDURAL STATUTE ENACTED TO PROTECT
THE ENVIRONMENT

37
Congress enacted NEPA with the goal of protecting the environment
by requiring federal agencies to evaluate significant environmental
impacts prior to undertaking major actions.38 NEPA established a
national environmental policy directing the federal government to use
"all practicable means" to "fulfill the responsibilities of each generation
as trustee of the environment for succeeding generations" and to "attain
the widest range of beneficial uses of the environment without
degradation." 39 NEPA has profoundly influenced decisionmaking by
federal agencies 40 and has made administrators more accessible and
accountable to the public. 41 The centerpiece of NEPA is its requirement
that federal agencies prepare an environmental impact statement (EIS)
prior to undertaking "major Federal actions significantly affecting the
quality of the human environment., 42 A federal agency must follow
NEPA's procedural requirements when it proposes legislation or

35. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706 (2000).
36. See U.S. CONST. art. Ill, § 2 (requiring a case or controversy for federal court jurisdiction).
37. See 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (2000) (declaring the goal of promoting efforts that "will prevent or
eliminate damage to the environment and biosphere and stimulate the health and welfare of man").
38. Id. § 4332(2).
39. Id. § 4331.
40. DANIEL R. MANDELKER, NEPA LAW AND LITIGATION § 1:1 (1992 & Supp. 2002).

41. Michael C. Blumm, The National EnvironmentalPolicy Act at Twenty: A Preface, 20 ENVTL.
L. 447, 453 (1990).
42. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(c).
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undertakes an administrative rulemaking process to adopt a new
regulation, such as a forest management plan or a pollution control rule,
that might have a significant effect on the environment. 43 Although
44
NEPA establishes procedural rather than substantive requirements,
these procedural requirements can lead federal agencies to abandon
environmentally damaging proposals 45 by requiring administrators to
consider the environmental effects of their actions and engage in a
public process that exposes these effects.
Because NEPA does not create a private cause of action, parties
seeking to challenge a NEPA decision in court must allege violations of
the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).46 Under the APA, citizens may
file suit alleging that a final agency decision was arbitrary and capricious
or otherwise not in accordance with law.47 A NEPA challenge brought
pursuant to the APA may include charges that the federal government
should have prepared a full EIS, or did prepare an EIS but failed to
consider an adequate range of alternatives.48 A typical result of a
successful NEPA challenge is an injunction against the federal action
pending NEPA compliance.49 On remand, the agency may either modify
its proposed action or correct analytical deficiencies.5 °
The APA requires plaintiffs to assert injuries "arguably within the
zone of interests" of the underlying statute to establish prudential
standing. 5' In applying the APA's zone of interest test, federal courts
interpret NEPA as protecting environmental, but not economic,
interests. 52 Thus, only parties who assert an injury within NEPA's
43. See id.
44. See Tillamook County v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 288 F.3d 1140, 1143 (9th Cir.

2002).
45. Blumm, supra note 41, at 452.
46. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551, 553-558, 701-706 (2000); Or. Natural Res. Council v. Bureau of Land
Mgmt., 150 F.3d 1132, 1135 (9th Cir. 1998).

47. See 5 U.S.C. § 706.
48. See 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(c).
49. See MANDELKER, supranote 40, § 4:54.
50. See id. § 4:61.
51. Ass'n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970); see 5 U.S.C. § 702
(granting a right of review to persons suffering legal wrong as a result of agency action "within the
meaning of the underlying statute").
52. See Taubman Realty Group v. Mineta, 320 F.3d 475, 481 (4th Cir. 2003) (noting that NEPA
does not require preparation of an environmental impact statement for economic or social effects
alone); Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. McDivitt, 286 F.3d 1031, 1037-38 (8th Cir. 2002); ANR Pipeline
Co. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 205 F.3d 403, 408 (D.C. Cir. 2000); Nev. Land Action v.
United States Forest Serv., 8 F.3d 713, 715-17 (9th Cir. 1993); MANDELKER, supra note 40, § 4:22.
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environmental zone of interest have standing to bring a NEPA
challenge.53
II.

RULE 24 ALLOWS ABSENTEES TO INTERVENE TO
DEFEND THEIR INTERESTS THAT MAY BE AFFECTED BY
PENDING LITIGATION

Intervention under Rule 24 allows an absentee with an interest in a
pending lawsuit to join the litigation as a party on its own motion.54 The
rule distinguishes between intervention of right under Rule 24(a)(2)"
and permissive intervention under Rule 24(b)(2).56 Although both forms
of intervention grant party status, there are significant practical
differences between the two in criteria, degree of participation, and
scope of review on appeal. The U.S. Supreme Court has established a
flexible and practical approach to evaluating intervention requests.57 As
a result, many federal courts have become "more receptive" to granting
intervention in the context of public law litigation.5 8 In spite of this
acceptance, Article III standing requirements 59 may limit the ability of
absentees to intervene in some situations.
A.

Rule 24 Allows Absentees To Intervene To Protect Their Interests
in Existing Litigation

Intervention allows absentees with an interest in pending litigation to
enter the lawsuit on their own motion. 60 A primary purpose of
intervention is to protect the rights of people who may potentially be
affected by litigation to which they are not parties. 6' This policy is
consistent with the nature of the adversary process, which requires the

53. See Nevada Land Action, 8 F.3d at 715-17.
54. 7C CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 1901 (2d ed. 1986).
55. FED. R. CIV. P. 24(a)(2).

56. Id. 24(b)(2).
57. See infra Part ll.B.
58. See Peter A. Appel, Intervention in Public Law Litigation: The Environmental Paradigm, 78
WASH. U. L.Q. 215, 217 (2000). Public law litigation is litigation used by multiple parties to resolve
grievances over public policy. See id. at 219-22.
59. See U.S. CONST. art. Ill, § 2.
60. WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 54, § 1901.

61. Kleissler v. United States Forest Serv., 157 F.3d 964, 971 (3d Cir. 1998).
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court to "hear from both
sides before the interests of one side are
62
judgment.
a
by
impaired
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24 governs intervention in federal
district courts.6 3 Rule 24(a)(2) requires a federal district court to allow an
absentee to intervene in an action when (1) the absentee makes a timely
motion to intervene, (2) the absentee has a significantly protectable
interest relating to the property or transaction that is the subject of the
action, (3) the applicant is so situated that the disposition of the litigation
may as a practical matter impair its ability to protect this interest, and (4)
none of the current parties adequately represents the absentee's
interest.64 The protectable interest requirement is often the critical factor
upon which courts decide whether or not an absentee can intervene of
right.65
Alternatively, a court may grant permissive intervention under Rule
24(b)(2). This Rule provides that a court "may" permit absentees to
intervene when their "claim or defense and the main action have a
question of law or fact in common. 66 The district court has discretion to
grant or deny intervention when an applicant meets these requirements
and establishes
independent grounds on which the court can assert
67
jurisdiction.
There are several significant practical differences between
intervention of right and permissive intervention. Most importantly,
intervention of right is not subject to district court discretion: if
absentees meet the requirements for intervention of right, the district
court must allow them to join the litigation. 68 In addition, although both
permissive intervenors and intervenors of right become parties to a

62. Sierra Club v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 995 F.2d 1478, 1483 (9th Cir. 1993).
63. FED. R. CIV. P. 24.

64. Wetlands Action Network v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 222 F.3d 1105, 1113 (9th
Cir. 2000). In relevant part, Rule 24(a) provides: "Upon timely application anyone shall be
permitted to intervene in an action.., when the applicant claims an interest relating to the property
or transaction which is the subject matter of the action and the applicant is so situated that the
disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede the applicant's ability to protect
that interest, unless the applicant's interest is adequately represented by existing parties." FED. R.
Civ. P. 24(a)(2).
65. See, e.g., Northwest Forest Res. Council v. Glickman, 82 F.3d 825, 837 (9th Cir. 1996)
(holding that an absentee was not entitled to intervene of right because it lacked a significantly
protectable interest).
66. FED. R. Civ. P. 24(b)(2).
67. Northwest Forest Res. Council, 82 F.3d at 839.

68. See FED. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2) ("anyone shall" be granted intervention).
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litigation,6 9 the district court has broad discretion to impose even "highly
70
restrictive" conditions on the involvement of permissive intervenors.
For example, the court can preclude a permissive intervenor from raising
new claims for relief, prevent the intervenor from participating in some
of the existing claims, and limit the intervenor's participation in
discovery. 71 By contrast, the district court has less discretion to limit the
scope of participation under Rule 24(a)(2) because an intervenor of right
has an interest in the litigation that cannot be adequately protected
without joining the litigation. 2 Finally, the scope of review on appeal
depends on whether intervention is of right or permissive. An appellate
73
court reviews a decision to grant or deny intervention of right de novo
but reviews
a decision of permissive intervention only for abuse of
74
discretion.
B.

The U.S. Supreme CourtHas Adopted a Flexible, Practical
Approach To the ProtectableInterest Requirementfor Intervention
of Right Under Rule 24(a)(2) in PublicLaw Litigation

The U.S. Supreme Court has established a pragmatic approach to
granting intervention of right under Rule 24(a)(2). 75 This approach
requires courts to focus on the practical effects of the litigation when
determining whether an absentee's protectable interest will be affected
by the ongoing litigation.7 6 The liberalized interest requirement has led
to increased flexibility for intervention in public law litigation 77 by
directing courts to consider the practical effect of the outcome of
litigation.78 Based on this pragmatic approach, courts in public law cases
often consider the stare decisis effect of a judgment, which, while not

69. See Stringfellow v. Concerned Neighbors in Action, 480 U.S. 370, 377 (1987).
70. Id. at 382 n.I (Brennan, J., concurring).
71. See id. at 373.
72. Id. at 381-82.

73. Wetlands Action Network v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 222 F.3d 1105, 1113 (9th
Cir. 2000).
74. Greene v. United States, 996 F.2d 973, 978 (9th Cir. 1993).
75. See Appel, supra note 58, at 215-16.

76. See FED. R. Civ. P. 24 advisory committee's notes to 1966 Amendments (noting that the prior
rule 24 was unduly restrictive and that this amendment reflects a more practical focus of liberalized
joinder requirements).
77. See Appel, supra note 58, at 215-16.
78. See Kleissler v. United States Forest Serv., 157 F.3d 964, 971 (3d Cir. 1998).
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directly binding non-parties, constitutes a significant practical
impairment in later litigation of the same issue. 79
For example, in Cascade Natural Gas Corp. v. El Paso Natural Gas
Co.,8 ° the U.S. Supreme Court established that some public concerns
constitute protectable interests sufficient to intervene of right under Rule
24(a)(2), 8' particularly when these concerns are protected by the statutes
under consideration in the case.82 The Court allowed the State of
California to intervene in an antitrust suit involving the regional natural
gas market,83 holding that the state's public interest in a competitive
natural gas market was the same interest that the antitrust laws at issue in
the case sought to protect. 84 In reaching this conclusion, the Court
reasoned that Rule 24(a)(2) focuses on the practical effects of
litigation, 85 and stated that if "an absentee would be substantially
affected in a practical sense by the determination made in an action, he
should, as a general rule, be entitled to intervene. 86
Thus, the Court implied that the purpose of the underlying statute is
relevant to determining whether absentees have a protectable interest
sufficient to intervene of right.87 Several circuits have applied a
comparable analysis to hold that the citizen suit provisions of the
Endangered Species Act (ESA) 88 establish a legally protected interest
sufficient for a private citizen to intervene of right to defend a federal
agency's decision to list a species under the act. 89 This inquiry is also
79. See infra notes 91-95 and accompanying text.
80. 386 U.S. 129 (1967).
81. See Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 68 (1986). The Court has provided little guidance on
what public concerns are sufficient for intervention of right. See Appel, supra note 58, at 256, 266.
82. See Diamond,476 U.S. at 66 n. 17.
83. Cascade NaturalGas Corp., 386 U.S. at 132.
84. Id. at 135-36.
85. Id. at 134 n.3.
86. Id. (emphasis omitted).
87. See id. at 135-36.
88. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (2000).
89. See, e.g., Coalition of Ariz./N.M. Counties for Stable Econ. Growth v. United States Dep't of
the Interior, 100 F.3d 837, 841-42 (10th Cir. 1996) (granting intervention of right to a private party
who had successfully petitioned and litigated for the listing of the Mexican Spotted Owl); Idaho
Farm Bureau Fed'n v. Babbitt, 58 F.3d 1392, 1395-98 (9th Cir. 1995) (granting intervention to
organizations that had successfully sued to secure listing of the Bruneau Hot Springs Snail); see also
Carl Tobias, Rethinking Intervention in Environmental Litigation, 78 WASH. U. L.Q 313, 316
(2000) (noting that the "touchstone of analysis will be the purpose of the environmental statute
which underlies the litigation, and how this purpose relates to the interest requirement for
intervention").
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closely analogous to the APA's zone of interest test for prudential
standing, which considers whether the underlying statute arguably
protects the plaintiff s interest. 90
Courts often base the grant of intervention to absentees in public law
cases on the potential stare decisis effect of a court's judgment
determining the legality of an agency decision. 9 Such a determination92
can create a significant practical barrier to future litigation of the issue.
The U.S. Supreme Court has noted that although persons who were not
parties to a particular adjudication are not bound by strict rules of res
judicata, "subsequent litigation serves little practical value to the
potential intervenor" because later courts would likely invoke the
doctrine of stare decisis and defer to the original decision. 93 For
example, the precedential effect of a decision that a particular forest
management statute bars even-age logging could impair the ability of
absentees to protect their interests in future lawsuits challenging the
application of that statute to other timber sales.94 Similarly, the stare
decisis effect of a judgment regarding disputed aboriginal land rights
constitutes a sufficient practical impairment to justify intervention of
right by absentee tribes claiming rights to the same land. 95 Granting
intervention in such situations avoids the problem of a court effectively
binding parties without first giving them an opportunity to be heard.96
As a result of Rule 24's liberalized interest requirements and the
effect of stare decisis, most federal courts have been generally receptive
to intervenors in public law cases. 97 Granting intervention in these cases
ensures that all sides are represented in litigation that implicates issues
of broad social concern.98 It can also reduce 9 future
litigation of the same
9
issues while broadening access to the courts.

90. See Ass'n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970); see also supra
notes 52-53 and accompanying text.
91. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Espy, 18 F.3d 1202, 1207 (5th Cir. 1994) (concluding that the
potential stare decisis effect of the judgment in the case would impair the interests of the absentees).
92. See id.
93. Int'l Union, United Auto., Aerospace & Agric. Implement Workers of Am. v. Scofield, 382
U.S. 205, 213 (1965).
94. Espy, 18 F.3d at 1207.
95. Oneida Indian Nation of Wis. v. New York, 732 F.2d 261, 265 (2d Cir. 1984).
96. Appel, supranote 58, at 299.
97. See id. at 282.
98. See Cindy Vreeland, Note, Public Interest Groups, Public Law Litigation, and Federal Rule
24(a), 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 279, 279 (1990).
99. Forest Conservation Council v. United States Forest Serv., 66 F.3d 1489, 1496 n.8 (9th Cir.
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Article III Standing May Limit the Ability ofAbsentees To
Intervene

The federal circuits disagree about whether a party seeking to
intervene of right at the district court level must satisfy Article III
standing requirements.10 0 Although the concepts of intervention of right
and standing have different origins and purposes,' 0 they have similar
requirements. ° 2 An applicant for intervention of right must demonstrate
a protectable interest that may be affected by the outcome of the
lawsuit.t°3 To establish standing, a plaintiff must allege an "invasion of0 a4
legally protected interest" that might be redressed by the litigation.
The similarity between these two standards has led some federal courts
to conflate the tests. For example, the Tenth Circuit has concluded that
meeting the requirements of standing is one way to demonstrate that an
absentee has a protectable interest sufficient to intervene of right.t0 5 In
some circuits, however,
requirements for standing pose a significant
06
barrier to intervention.1
Although the federal circuits differ on whether standing is required to
intervene at the district court level, the U.S. Supreme Court has
established that an intervenor must demonstrate independent Article III
standing in order to appeal a judgment without the party on whose side
1995).
100. See U.S. CONST. art. Ill, § 2; Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 68-69 (1986); Tyler R.
Stradling & Doyle S. Byers, Comment, Intervening in the Case (or Controversy): Article III
Standing, Rule 24 Intervention, and the Conflict in the FederalCourts, 2003 BYU L. REV. 419,
424-35 (noting that of the eight circuits to consider the issue, three require standing and five do
not). Compare Portland Audubon Soc'y v. Hodel, 866 F.2d 302, 308 n.1 (9th Cir. 1989) (noting that
the Ninth Circuit resolves intervention questions without reference to standing doctrine), with
United States v. 36.96 Acres of Land, 754 F.2d 855, 859-60 (7th Cir. 1985) (holding that an
organization's aesthetic and environmental interests were not sufficient under Rule 24(a)(2), which
requires a "direct and substantial" legally-protectable interest).
101. Carl Tobias, Standing To Intervene, 1991 WIS. L. REV. 415, 416-17 (noting that standing
entails whether a plaintiff can initiate a lawsuit in order to meet Article IlI's case or controversy
requirement, while intervention entails whether an absentee may participate in ongoing litigation in
which the plaintiff already has standing). This Note will not address standing in intervention cases.
For more information about the application of standing requirements to intervention analysis, see
generally id.
102. See PortlandAudubonSoc'y, 866 F.2d at 308 nI.
103. See id. at 308.
104. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992).
105. See Coalition of Ariz./N.M. Counties for Stable Econ. Growth v. United States Dep't of the
Interior, 100 F.3d 837, 842 (10th Cir. 1996).
106. See, e.g., United States v. 36.96 Acres of Land, 754 F.2d 855, 859-60 (7th Cir. 1985).
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they intervened. 0 7 In Diamond v. Charles,10 8 the Court held that a

private individual whose conduct is not directly implicated by a state
abortion law could not appeal a decision finding the law unconstitutional
because the state did not appeal. 10 9 The intervenor lacked a judicially
cognizable interest in the state's prosecution of another person under this
criminal statute." The Court reasoned that because only the state could
adopt a legal code, only the state has standing to defend the code against
a constitutional attack.' However, the Court left open the possibility
that a private party could establish standing to defend 1the
2
constitutionality of a statute that creates a protectable private interest.'
In sum, the U.S. Supreme Court has established a pragmatic test for
granting intervention under Rule 24. Courts must grant intervention of
right when absentees meet the requirements of Rule 24(a)(2),
guaranteeing the opportunity to defend interests at stake in pending
litigation. By contrast, courts have broad discretion to grant, deny, or
limit the scope of intervention under Rule 24(b)(2). Federal courts are
generally receptive to intervenors in public law cases, particularly when
the absentees seek to vindicate interests consistent with the purpose of
the underlying statute. However, Article III standing requirements may
limit the ability of public interest organizations to intervene in some
circumstances.
III.

THE NINTH CIRCUIT LIBERALLY GRANTS
INTERVENTION OF RIGHT IN PUBLIC LAW CASES
EXCEPT TO THOSE DEFENDING NEPA CHALLENGES

The Ninth Circuit liberally approves intervention requests in most
public law cases.' 13 The court broadly grants intervention of right to
private groups to defend procedural or constitutional challenges to laws
or regulations other than NEPA," 4 but it applies the federal defendant
rule to deny intervention of right by parties other than the federal

107. Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 68-69 (1986).

108. 476 U.S. 54 (1986).
109. Id. at 56.

110. Id. at 64-65, 71.
Ill. Id. at 65.
112. Id. at 65-66, 65 n.17.
113. See Vreeland, supra note 98, at 289.
114. See infra Part III.A.
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government to defend NEPA challenges. 15 In reaching these
contradictory results, the court has not explained how NEPA differs
from other procedural or constitutional rules that a private party cannot
violate.' 16
A.

The Ninth CircuitInterpretsRule 24(a)(2) in Favor of Granting
Intervention, and Generally Allows Public Interest Groups To
Defend GovernmentDecisions

The Ninth Circuit generally interprets Rule 24(a)(2)'s protectable
interest requirement broadly."t 7 The court views Rule 24(a)(2)'s
protectable interest test as "primarily a practical guide to disposing of
lawsuits by involving as many apparently concerned persons as is
compatible with efficiency and due process."' 1 8 Applying these
principles to non-NEPA cases, the Ninth Circuit implicitly rejects the
federal defendant rule by granting intervention of right to groups
"directly involved in the enactment of the law or in the administrative
proceedings out of which the litigation arose" to defend even procedural
and constitutional challenges to government actions. 19
When private groups have sought to intervene to defend non-NEPA
challenges to laws for which they had advocated, the Ninth Circuit has
demonstrated broad flexibility in granting intervention of right. 20 The
115. See infra Part II.B.
116. Compare Sagebrush Rebellion, Inc. v. Watt, 713 F.2d 525, 526-27 (9th Cir. 1983) (granting
intervention of right to organizations that had participated in the administration designation of a
conservation area), Wash. State Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Spellman, 684 F.2d 627, 630
(9th Cir. 1982) (granting intervention of right to an initiative sponsor to defend a constitutional
challenge), and Idaho v. Freeman, 625 F.2d 886, 887 (9th Cir. 1980) (granting intervention of right
to the National Organization for Women to defend a constitutional challenge), with Kootenai 11,
313
F.3d 1094, 1108 (9th Cir. 2002) (denying intervention of right to organizations that had promoted
adoption of the Roadless Rule).
117. See Spellman, 684 F.2d at 630.
118. Forest Conservation Council v. United States Forest Serv., 66 F.3d 1489, 1496 (9th Cir.
1995) (quoting Nuesse v. Camp, 385 F.2d 694, 700 (D.C. Cir. 1967)).
119. Northwest Forest Res. Council v. Glickman, 82 F.3d 825, 837 (9th Cir. 1996).
120. See id. Several other federal courts have followed the Ninth Circuit's lead in granting
intervention of right to private groups to defend the constitutionality of laws for which they had
advocated. See Utah Ass'n of Counties v. Clinton, 255 F.3d 1246, 1256 (10th Cir. 2001) (granting
intervention of right to environmental groups to defend a monument designation); Mich. State AFLCIO v. Miller, 103 F.3d 1240, 1245-47 (6th Cir. 1997) (citing Ninth Circuit cases in granting
intervention to the Chamber of Commerce to defend a constitutional challenge to a campaign
finance reform law that the Chamber had previously advocated for at the state legislature); Mausolf
v. Babbitt, 85 F.3d 1295, 1296, 1303-04 (8th Cir. 1996) (granting intervention of right to
conservation groups that had been involved in prior litigation and administrative proceedings to
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court has granted intervention in non-NEPA cases even when the private
groups could not themselves have enacted, enforced, or violated the law
at issue in the case.' 2' For example, the Ninth Circuit granted
intervention of right to the National Organization for Women to defend a
constitutional challenge to the ratification procedures of the proposed
Equal Rights Amendment because it had a continuing interest in the
amendment that would be impaired by an adverse decision. 122 The court
has also allowed the private sponsor of a ballot initiative to intervene of
right to defend a Commerce Clause 123 challenge because of the
sponsor's direct involvement in the adoption of the law. 124 Similarly, the
court recently allowed the private sponsors of an anti-trapping initiative
to intervene to defend a constitutional challenge involving claims of
federal preemption under the Supremacy
Clause 25 as well as due
26
process and Commerce Clause claims.
The Ninth Circuit has also granted intervention of right to defend
procedural challenges to administrative decisions in environmental
litigation involving statutes other than NEPA. In Sagebrush Rebellion,
Inc. v. Watt, 127 the court granted intervention of right to environmental
organizations to defend a procedural challenge 28 to the Interior
Secretary's decision to withdraw nearly a half million acres under the a
federal land management statute in order to create a bird conservation
area. 29 The court concluded that the environmental organizations that
participated in the rulemaking process had a significantly protectable
interest in the conservation of birds and their habitats that would,
as a
30
case.'
the
in
judgment
adverse
an
by
impaired
be
practical matter,
defend a challenge to snowmobile restrictions at Voyageurs National Park); A & P v. Town of E.
Hampton, 178 F.R.D. 39, 41-42 (E.D.N.Y. 1998) (granting intervention of right to a group that had

actively advocated for adoption of a Superstore Law to defend a constitutional challenge).
121. See, e.g., Freeman, 625 F.2d at 887 (granting intervention of right to a private organization

to defend a challenge to procedures for adopting a constitutional amendment).
122. Id.

123. Wash. State Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Spellman, 684 F.2d 627, 629-30 (9th Cir.
1982).
124. Id.

125. See Nat'l Audubon Soc'y, Inc. v. Davis, 307 F.3d 835, 841-42 (9th Cir.), as amended on
denial ofreh'g en banc, 312 F.3d 416 (9th Cir. 2002).
126. See id.
127. 713 F.2d 525 (9th Cir. 1983).
128. Id. at 526, 529.
129. Id.at 526.
130. Id. at 526-28.
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Similarly, absentees who petition to list a species under the ESA can
intervene of right to defend litigation seeking to eliminate or reduce
protections for that species because of the government's alleged
procedural violations.131 For example, in Idaho Farm Bureau Federation
v. Babbitt, 32 plaintiffs challenged the procedures that led to the listing of
the Bruneau Hot Springs Snail under the ESA, including the alleged
failure by the federal government to comply with time limits and notice
requirements. 33 The intervening environmental groups had actively
participated in the administrative process leading to the decision,
including filing the original petition for listing and suing the agency to
force it to act. 3 4 In determining that the conservation groups had a
protectable interest sufficient to intervene of right under Rule 24(a)(2),
the Ninth Circuit stated that "a public interest group is entitled as a
in an action challenging the legality of a
matter of right to intervene
' 35
supported."'
has
it
measure
In Didrickson v. United States Department of the Interior,36 the Ninth
Circuit allowed permissive intervenors to appeal a district court decision
that overturned a wildlife regulation when the original federal
government defendant declined to appeal. 137 Although this case involved
permissive intervention, the court's reasoning is relevant to determining
whether intervenors have a right to appeal a district court decision
invalidating a government action. 38 The Didrickson court considered the
practical effects of denying the request, noting that by acquiescing to the
district court's judgment overturning the regulation, the government had
effectively promulgated a new regulation adverse to the intervenors'
position. 39 Moreover, the intervenors participated in the rulemaking
proceedings leading to the regulation, 40 and could have challenged the
government's new position under the APA had this been the agency's
original decision.' 4 1 Thus, the lower court judgment created a sufficient
131. See Idaho Farm Bureau Fed'n v. Babbitt, 58 F.3d 1392, 1397 (9th Cir. 1995).
132. 58 F.3d 1392 (9th Cir. 1995).

133. Id. at 1395.
134. Id. at 1398.
135. Id. at 1397 (emphasis added).
136. 982 F.2d 1332 (9th Cir. 1992).
137. Id. at 1337-39.
138. See id.

139. Id. at 1339.
140. Id. at 1338-39.
141. See 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2000).
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interest to justify permissive intervention."' In addition, the court
expressly rejected the government's argument that, based on the
Supreme Court's decision in Diamond, it was the 1only
party that could
43
have standing to defend its own regulation in court.
In granting intervention to private groups to defend these diverse
government actions, the Ninth Circuit has repeatedly noted the
importance of the intervenors' participation in the process of adopting
the challenged law.144 By contrast, the Ninth Circuit has held that a
group's generalized environmental interests were not sufficient to
intervene of right in defense of legislation that the group had not
promoted. 45 This participation interest continues to be a basis for
granting intervention of right under Rule 24(a)(2)
to non-governmental
146
challenges.
non-NEPA
defend
to
organizations
B.

The Ninth CircuitHas Severely Restricted Intervention of Right by
Groups Other Than the Federal Government To Defend NEPA
Challenges

In contrast to its decisions in non-NEPA cases, the Ninth Circuit has
strictly limited the ability of private groups to intervene to defend NEPA
challenges. In a series of NEPA cases beginning with PortlandAudubon
Society v. Hodel,147 the Ninth Circuit has stated two discrete rationales
for denying defendant-side intervention. First, the court has adopted a
blanket federal defendant rule, holding that because only the federal
government can violate NEPA, it is the only proper defendant in a
NEPA challenge. 148 Second, in many of the same cases, the court also
denied intervention because the applicants asserted purely economic

142. Didrickson, 982 F.2d at 1338-39.

143. Id. at 1339-40.
144. See, e.g., id. at 1339 (noting that the proposed intervenors had participated in the relevant

rulemaking process as a basis for granting permissive intervention); Sagebrush Rebellion, Inc. v.
Watt, 713 F.2d 525, 526-27 (9th Cir. 1983) (citing the fact that "[b]oth groups participated actively
in the administrative process ... to establish the Birds of Prey Conservation Area").
145. Northwest Forest Res. Council v. Glickman, 82 F.3d 825, 837-38 (9th Cir. 1996).
146. See, e.g., Nat'l Audubon Soc'y v. Davis, 307 F.3d 835, 842 (9th Cir. 2002) (allowing the

sponsor of an anti-trapping initiative to intervene to defend a constitutional challenge).
147. 866 F.2d 302 (9th Cir. 1989).
148. Wetlands Action Network v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 222 F.3d 1105, 1114 (9th
Cir. 2000); Churchill County v. Babbitt, 150 F.3d 1072, 1082 (9th Cir. 1998); Sierra Club v. Envtl.
Prot. Agency, 995 F.2d 1478, 1485 (9th Cir. 1993); see Portland Audubon Soc'y v. Hodel, 866 F.2d
302, 309 (9th Cir. 1989) (citing Wade v. Goldschmidt, 673 F.2d 182, 185 (7th Cir. 1982)).
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injuries that fall outside of NEPA's zone of interest for the
environment. 49 These two competing rationales have led to ambiguity in
the Ninth Circuit's application of Rule 24,150 particularly when absentees
assert environmental injuries. Several other federal courts have rejected
the Ninth Circuit's federal defendant rule as being inconsistent with the
5
purposes of Rule 24 and its emphasis on practical considerations.' '
The Ninth Circuit bases its federal defendant rule on the rationale that
because NEPA establishes procedural requirements for the federal
government, only the federal government can be liable for failing to
comply with NEPA. 152 For example, the court applied the federal
defendant rule in Wetlands Action Network v. United States Army Corps
of Engineers'5 3 to deny intervention of right to a developer who sought
to defend a NEPA challenge to a federal permit that allowed it to fill
wetlands on its property. 154 Because a private party cannot violate
NEPA, the court ruled that the developer could not defend the NEPA
challenge. 155 Similarly, the court in Sierra Club v. Environmental
Protection Agency' 56 stated that interests that might be significantly
protectable in other circumstances may not suffice for intervention of
57
right to defend a NEPA challenge.'
The Ninth Circuit has also applied the APA's zone of interest test to
determine whether prospective intervenors satisfy the protectable
interest requirement for intervention of right in a NEPA case. 58 In
applying this test to determine whether a private party has standing to
149. Wetlands, 222 F.3d at 1109; Sierra Club, 995 F.2d at 1485; PortlandAudubon Soc'y, 866
F.2d at 309.
150. Kootenai H, 313 F.3d 1094, 1108 (9th Cir. 2002).
151. Kleissler v. United States Forest Serv., 157 F.3d 964, 971 (3d Cir. 1998) (noting that the
Ninth Circuit's rigid rule in NEPA cases contravenes the major purpose of intervention, which is to
protect third parties affected by pending litigation); Sierra Club v. Espy, 18 F.3d 1202, 1207 (5th
Cir. 1994) (concluding that the stare decisis effect of a decision in a NEPA challenge could impair
the intervenors' property interests); Wilderness Soc'y v. Babbitt, 104 F. Supp. 2d 10, 18 (D.D.C.
2000) (concluding that the purposes of Rule 24 are best served by allowing interested parties to
participate in all aspects of the litigation).
152. See, e.g., Wetlands, 222 F.3d at 1114.
153. Id. at 1105.
154. Id. at 1109.

155. Id. at 1114.
156. 995 F.2d 1478 (9th Cir. 1993).
157. Id. at 1485.
158. See Forest Conservation Council v. United States Forest Serv., 66 F.3d 1489, 1497 (9th Cir.
1995) (noting that the intervenors asserted non-economic interests "within NEPA's zone of concern
for the environment") (quoting Douglas County v. Babbitt, 48 F.3d 1495, 1497 (9th Cir. 1995)).
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bring a NEPA challenge, the court has concluded that "the purpose of
NEPA is to protect the environment, not the economic interests of those
adversely affected by agency decisions."'' 59 Applying this reasoning to
questions of intervention of right, the court has denied intervention to
absentees who assert purely economic injuries because they do not have
a protectable interest under NEPA. 160 For example, in PortlandAudubon
Society, the court denied intervention to logging companies seeking to
defend a NEPA challenge that would enjoin a group of timber sales. 161
The court distinguished Sagebrush Rebellion, noting that the logging
companies seeking to intervene in Portland Audubon Society asserted
purely economic claims that were not protected by NEPA whereas the
interests that were protected by
Sagebrush Rebellion intervenors asserted
162
the federal law at issue in the case.
However, other statutes can create an interest sufficient to intervene
of right to defend a NEPA challenge even when the absentees do not
assert environmental interests. For example, in Sierra Club v.
EnvironmentalProtectionAgency, the court concluded that the holder of
a Clean Water Act discharge permit had a protectable interest sufficient
163
to intervene of right to defend a NEPA challenge to that permit.
Although NEPA did not protect the intervenor's economic interest, the
Clean Water Act did.164
The Ninth Circuit has granted a limited form of intervention to
absentees asserting purely economic interests. 65 The court denied
intervention of right to defend the government's compliance with NEPA
in the liability phase of the trial. 166 However, it granted permissive
intervention under Rule 24(b)(2) to allow intervenors to participate in
the remedial phase of the trial when the court decides whether to impose
an injunction. 167

159. Nev. Land Action Ass'n v. United States Forest Serv., 8 F.3d 713, 716 (9th Cir. 1993)
(noting that a plaintiff who asserts purely economic injuries falls outside NEPA's zone of interest).
160. Portland Audubon Soc'y v. Hodel, 866 F.2d 302, 309 (9th Cir. 1989).
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Sierra Club v. United States Envtl. Prot. Agency, 995 F.2d 1478, 1485-86 (9th Cir. 1993).
164. Id.
165. Wetlands Action Network v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 222 F.3d 1105, 1109,
1114 (9th Cir. 2000); Churchill County v. Babbitt, 150 F.3d 1072, 1083 (9th Cir. 1998).
166. Wetlands, 222 F.3d at 1109, 1114; Churchill County, 150 F.3d at 1083.
167. See Wetlands, 222 F.3d at 1109, 1114; Churchill County, 150 F.3d at 1083.
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The Ninth Circuit combined its use of the federal defendant rule and
NEPA's zone of interest test in Forest Conservation Council v. United
States Forest Service.168 The court held that entities asserting
environmental injuries have a protectable interest sufficient to intervene
of right in a NEPA challenge, but could only participate in the remedial
phase of the trial. 69 The court concluded that the State of Arizona's
interests in preventing forest fires and pest infestations on state land
adjacent to the National Forests affected by the litigation constituted a
concrete, plausible conservation concern within NEPA's zone of
concern for the environment.1 70 However, under the federal defendant
rule, the state lacked a protectable interest in the government's
compliance with NEPA,
and thus could participate only in the remedial
7
phase of the trial. 1 '

Several other federal courts have considered and rejected the Ninth
Circuit's federal defendant rule for NEPA cases as unduly formalistic
given the flexible and practical approach of Rule 24.172 In Kleissler v.
United States Forest Service, 73 a NEPA challenge involving timber
sales that would provide revenue to local communities, the Third Circuit
expressly rejected the "narrow approach" of the Ninth Circuit's federal
defendant rule.' 74 The court stated that the Ninth Circuit's approach
"minimizes the flexibility and spirit of Rule 24 as interpreted in Cascade
Natural Gas."'175 The Kleissler court granted intervention of right to
local school districts and municipalities to participate in both the liability
and the remedial phases of the trial, noting the practical effects of a
potential injunction on the intervenors' interests.1 76 Similarly, the Fifth
Circuit granted intervention of right to defend both the liability and
remedial phases of a NEPA challenge in Sierra Club v. Espy177 because
168. 66 F.3d 1489 (9th Cir. 1995).
169. Id. at 1496, 1499.

170. Id. at 1497.
171. Id.at 1499&n.11.
172. Kleissler v. United States Forest Serv., 157 F.3d 964, 971 (3d Cir. 1998); Sierra Club v.
Espy, 18 F.3d 1202, 1207-08 (5th Cir. 1994); Wilderness Soc'y v. Babbitt, 104 F. Supp. 2d 10, 18

(D.D.C. 2000). However, at least one other federal court follows the federal defendant rule,
applying reasoning very similar to the Ninth Circuit's. See Wade v. Goldschmidt, 673 F.2d 182, 185
(7th Cir. 1982).
173. 157 F.3d 964 (3d Cir. 1998).

174. Id. at 97 1.
175. Id.

176. Id. at 972-73.
177. 18 F.3d 1202 (5th Cir. 1994).
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the stare decisis effect of the decision would impair the intervenor's
protectable interests. 7 8 Finally, the District Court for the District of
Columbia noted that its circuit had not adopted the federal defendant
rule and concluded that the purposes of Rule 24 would best79be served by
full participation by affected parties in a NEPA challenge.
In sum, the Ninth Circuit's federal defendant rule in NEPA cases
contrasts with its liberal grant of intervention when other statutes or
regulations are at issue. Outside of the NEPA context, the Ninth Circuit
has granted intervention to defend even constitutional and procedural
violations that only the government could commit. The Ninth Circuit's
more restrictive rule for intervention in NEPA cases is also at odds with
several other circuits' NEPA cases.
IV. IN KOOTENAI TRIBE OFIDAHO V. VENEMAN, THE NINTH
CIRCUIT APPLIED THE FEDERAL DEFENDANT RULE TO
DENY INTERVENTION OF RIGHT
In Kootenai Tribe of Idaho v. Veneman, the Ninth Circuit
substantially limited the ability of environmental groups to intervene to
defend NEPA challenges. Although the Kootenai court upheld a farreaching conservation law that would protect nearly sixty million acres
of National Forests from logging and roadbuilding, it extended the
federal defendant rule beyond its prior application by denying
intervention of right to organizations that both asserted environmental
injuries 8 0 and participated actively in the rulemaking process.'18 Instead,
the court granted only permissive intervention. 182 By so holding, the
court left the environmental groups' ability to intervene to defend future
NEPA challenges to the discretion of the district court under Rule
24(b)(2). "'
The Forest Service adopted the Roadless Rule after numerous
environmental groups worked for years to secure strong protections for

178. Id. at 1207.
179. Wilderness Soc'y v. Babbitt, 104 F. Supp. 2d 10, 18 (D.D.C. 2000).
180. Kootenai H, 313 F.3d 1094, 1104, 1109-10 (9th Cir. 2002).
181. See Wyoming v. United States Dep't of Agric., 201 F. Supp. 2d 1151, 1153-54 (D. Wyo.
2002) (hearing a parallel challenge to the Roadless Rule in which plaintiffs alleged that the federal
government had violated the Federal Advisory Committee Act by working too closely with
environmental groups to formulate the Roadless Rule).
182. Kootenai 11, 313 F.3d at 1110.
183. See Northwest Forest Res. Council v. Glickman, 82 F.3d 825, 839 (9th Cir. 1996).
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these remote wildlands in the National Forests. 184 The Forest Service
began to study and inventory roadless areas larger than five thousand
acres in the 1970s.185 In response to active persuasion by environmental
groups during the Clinton administration, 186 the Forest Service initiated a
NEPA rulemaking process in October 1999 to develop a nationwide plan
to protect these roadless areas. 8 7 The Forest Service issued a
comprehensive EIS in May 2000 examining the potential impacts of
implementing the Rule. 188 Just days before leaving office, the Clinton
administration issued a final rule that would ban most new roadbuilding
and logging in 58.5 million acres of inventoried roadless areas in
National Forests throughout the United States.' 89
Environmental organizations participated extensively throughout the
NEPA rulemaking process, actively seeking adoption of the Roadless
Rule. 190 As a result of a broad campaign by these and other
organizations, the Forest Service received more than 1.15 million
comments on the Roadless Rule EIS, ninety-six percent of which
favored strong protections. 19' In response to this public support, the
Forest Service issued its final rule in January 2001, prohibiting most
roadbuilding and increasing the area to be "committed to pristine
92
wilderness" by seven million acres. 1
Three days later, the Kootenai Tribe of Idaho, the State of Idaho, and
snowmobile, timber, and livestock groups filed suit in the District Court
of Idaho to challenge the Roadless Rule. 193 They alleged procedural
violations of NEPA, including failure to consider an adequate range of
alternatives. 194 The newly-inaugurated President George W. Bush
temporarily suspended implementation of the Roadless Rule.' 9' The
Forest Service then announced that it would initiate a new rulemaking

184. See Wyoming, 201 F. Supp. 2d at 1153.
185. Kootenaill, 313 F.3d at 1104.
186. See Wyoming, 201 F. Supp. 2d at 1153.
187. Kootenai 11,
313 F.3d at 1105.
188. Id.

189. Id.
190. Wyoming, 201 F. Supp. 2d at 1153.

191. See Kootenai 11, 313 F.3d at 1116 n.19, 1119.
192. Id.at 1105-06.
193. Id.at 1104.
194. Id.at 1120.
195. Id.at 1106.
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process because of196the administration's concerns over how the rule had
been promulgated.

Anticipating that the Bush administration might not vigorously defend
the Roadless Rule, several environmental groups sought to intervene to
defend the NEPA challenge.1 97 The district court granted intervention of
right under Rule 24(a)(2) and concluded that the groups satisfied the
requirements of having a protectable interest that could be impaired by
an adverse judgment and that was not adequately represented by the
existing parties. 198 The court reasoned that the environmental groups
asserted conservation interests protected by NEPA and fell within the
Sagebrush Rebellion rule allowing groups that actively supported a
federal regulation during the administrative rulemaking process to
intervene of right to defend the regulation.'" The court further reasoned
that the federal defendants may not adequately represent these
conservation interests because the federal defendants must represent the
broad public interest rather than the specific environmental concerns of
the intervenors.2 °° In addition, the court alternatively granted permissive
intervention under Rule 24(b)(2). 20 1 However, after allowing the groups
to intervene, the court rejected their NEPA arguments and held that the
Forest Service had considered an inadequate range of alternatives and
provided an inadequate comment period.20 2 The court later issued 20a3
temporary injunction blocking implementation of the Roadless Rule.
The Forest Service declined to appeal this decision, and the
environmental intervenors appealed without the original defendant.20 4
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit invoked the federal defendant rule to
reject the district court's grant of intervention of right under Rule
24(a)(2). 20 5 The court first considered whether intervenors asserting
environmental interests could defend the federal government's alleged
violations of NEPA's procedural requirements without the government's
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Kootenai Tribe of Idaho v. Veneman, No. CVO I- 10-N-EJL (D. Idaho Mar. 14, 200 1) (order
granting intervention).
199. Id.
200. id.
201. Id.

202. Kootenai I, 142 F. Supp. 2d 1231, 1244, 1246-47 (D. Idaho 2001).
203. Kootenai 11, 313 F.3d 1094, 1106-07 (9th Cir. 2002).
204. Id. at 1107.
205. Id. at 1108.
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participation. 20 6 While admitting that its precedent on this issue was
perhaps not "crystal clear, ' 20 7 the court determined that under the federal
defendant rule, these groups lacked the significantly protectable interest
in the rulemaking process required to intervene of right2. ° In so holding,
the court did not distinguish 20 9 either its application of NEPA's zone of
interest test to grant intervention of right to groups asserting
environmental injuries in Forest Conservation Council2 1° or the
Sagebrush Rebellion rule that groups can intervene of right to defend a
federal regulation they supported.2 '
Although the Ninth Circuit denied intervention of right, it held that
the district court had not abused its discretion by granting permissive
intervention under Rule 24(b)(2).2 12 The court reasoned that the
environmental groups raised common issues of law or fact with the
primary claims in the case by asserting defenses directly responsive to
the claim for an injunction and, while lacking a direct interest in the
rulemaking process, had interests in the use and enjoyment of roadless
areas that would be protected by the Roadless Rule. 2 3 The Ninth Circuit
noted that the federal government had declined from the beginning to
defend the Roadless Rule and cited with approval the district court's
intervenors would "contribute to the
reasoning that participation by the
' 214
equitable resolution of this case.
The Ninth Circuit also held that the intervenors had standing to appeal
the decision without the federal government based on their
environmental interests in the implementation of the rule. 2 15 Under the
U.S. Supreme Court's holding in Diamond, the intervenors were
required to establish independent Article III standing because the
government did not appeal.21 6 In holding that the intervenors had
standing, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that they had suffered an imminent

206. Id. at 1107.
207. Id. at 1108.
208. Id.
209. See id. at 1107-08.
210. Forest Conservation Council v. United States Forest Serv., 66 F.3d 1489, 1497 (9th Cir.

1995).
211. Sagebrush Rebellion, Inc. v. Watt, 713 F.2d 525, 527-28 (9th Cir. 1983).
212. Kootenai 11, 313 F.3d at I I l1.
213. Id.at I110-11.
214. Id.at II 11.
215. Id. at 1109-10.
216. Id. at 1109; see supra Part II.C.
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invasion of a "legally-protected interest" in their use of the public lands
that would receive less protection if the Roadless Rule were not
implemented.217 This injury was caused by the injunction and could be
redressed by a decision to reinstate the Roadless Rule.2 18
After deciding these procedural issues, the Ninth Circuit held that the
government had complied with NEPA and lifted the injunction. 2' 9 The
court agreed with the intervenors' arguments that the government had
followed the correct procedures and considered an adequate range of
alternatives. 220 Noting that the agency was "now governed by a new
presidential administration which is perhaps less sympathetic to the
Roadless Rule," the court expressly rejected the Forest Service's
argument that the court should leave the injunction in place because
implementing the rule would cause irreparable harm. 22 1 The court's
decision to reinstate the Roadless Rule thus depended solely on the
participation of the intervenors, who presented the only defense to the
NEPA challenge while the government argued against implementing its
own regulation.222
In summary, the Kootenai court extended the federal defendant rule to
disallow intervention of right by environmental groups that had actively
participated in the NEPA process. These groups are limited to
permissive intervention under Rule 24(b)(2). Thus, the Kootenai court
limited future defendant-side intervention by environmental groups in
NEPA cases to the discretion of district courts.
V.

THE NINTH CIRCUIT ERRED IN DENYING INTERVENTION
OF RIGHT TO ENVIRONMENTAL GROUPS SEEKING TO
DEFEND THE ROADLESS RULE

The Kootenai court misapplied Rule 24 and contradicted the
environmental purpose of NEPA by denying intervention of right to
conservation groups that had actively participated in the adoption of the
Roadless Rule. This case demonstrates that the Ninth Circuit's federal

217. Kootenai 11, 313 F.3dat 1109.

218. Id. at 1110. This standing analysis differs from the more typical case where the plaintiff
must demonstrate Article III standing. Here, because the intervenors are defendants, their injury
cannot be caused directly by the defendants as is typically required.
219. Id.at 1126.
220. Id. at 1121-22.
221. Id. at 1124.
222. See id. at 1111.
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defendant rule contravenes Rule 24(a)(2) by failing to account for the
practical impairment of the protectable interests of absentees. The Ninth
Circuit should abandon its blanket rule denying defendant-side
intervention of right in NEPA cases.223 Instead, the court should apply
Rule 24(a)(2) by focusing on whether the interests asserted by absentees
are protected by NEPA,224 whether the absentees established a
protectable interest by actively participating in the administrative
rulemaking process, 225 and whether the outcome of litigation might
impair these interests.22 6 Under this approach, the Kootenai intervenors
satisfied the requirements for intervention of right because they asserted
protectable conservation interests under NEPA227 and had actively
supported the Roadless Rule throughout the NEPA administrative
2 28
rulemaking process.
A.

The Ninth Circuit'sFederalDefendant Rule MisappliesRule 24

The Ninth Circuit's federal defendant rule misapplies Rule 24. The
primary purpose of Rule 24 is to allow absentees to protect their interests
by permitting them to participate in existing litigation that might impair
these interests. 229 By applying the federal defendant rule to deny
intervention of right to environmental organizations, the Ninth Circuit
has prevented these groups from joining litigation that might have a
profound practical effect on their protectable interests unless the district
court exercises its discretion to grant permissive intervention. This
application of the federal defendant rule is inconsistent with the
environmental purpose of NEPA because it renders participation by
organizations asserting conservation interests less likely. In addition, the

223. The Ninth Circuit does not currently apply the federal defendant rule to statutes other than
NEPA. See supra Part III.A. However, for the same reasons discussed infra Part V.A, the Ninth
Circuit should likewise decline to extend the federal defendant rule to bar intervention to defend
procedural challenges under other statutes.
224. See Forest Conservation Council v. United States Forest Serv., 66 F.3d 1489, 1497 (9th Cir.
1995).
225. See, e.g., Sagebrush Rebellion, Inc. v. Watt, 713 F.2d 525, 527 (9th Cir. 1983).
226. See Cascade Natural Gas Corp. v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 386 U.S. 129, 134 n.3 (1967).
227. See Coalition of Ariz./N.M. Counties v. United States Dep't of the Interior, 100 F.3d 837,
841-42 (10th Cir. 1996) (concluding that the ESA creates a protectable interest for a proposed
intervenor who had petitioned for listing an endangered species).
228. See SagebrushRebellion, 713 F.2d at 527.
229. See Kleissler v. United States Forest Serv., 157 F.3d 964, 971 (3d Cir. 1998).
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federal defendant rule contradicts the Ninth Circuit's more liberal grant
of intervention of right to defend laws other than NEPA cases.2
1.

The Ninth Circuit'sFederalDefendant Rule Misapplies Rule
24(a)(2) by FailingTo Assess the PracticalEffects of Pending
Litigationon ProtectableEnvironmentalInterests

The federal defendant rule undermines the purpose of Rule 24
because district courts must deny intervention of right to groups that
assert protectable interests in the environment even when the outcome of
the litigation is likely to directly and profoundly affect these interests.23
The U.S. Supreme Court has specifically rejected this type of rigid
interpretation of the protectable interest requirement, instead directing
courts to adopt a pragmatic approach.2 32 As noted by the Third Circuit in
Kleissler, the federal defendant rule is an unusually narrow and
formalistic reading of Rule 24 that ignores the U.S. Supreme Court's
233
focus on practical effects in evaluating intervention requests.
The Kootenai court demonstrated this narrow reasoning by drawing
an imperceptibly fine distinction between satisfying the injury-in-fact
requirement for Article III standing and the protectable interest
requirement for Rule 24(a)(2), concluding that the intervenors satisfied
the former but not the latter.23 4 Although the purposes of standing and
intervention of right differ, the requirements for both are similar. 23 5 In its
analysis of standing, the Kootenai court concluded that the intervenors
had suffered an injury in fact, or an invasion of a "legally-protected
interest," to their use and appreciation of the areas to be protected by the
Roadless Rule.236 This injury was caused by the injunction that blocked
implementation of the Roadless Rule, and could be redressed by lifting
the injunction.23 7 When the court applied Rule 24(a)(2)'s test for
intervention of right, however, it invoked the federal defendant rule to
conclude that the intervenors lacked a "significantly protectable

230. See supraPart II.lA.
231. See Kootenai 1, 313 F.3d 1094, 1108 (9th Cir. 2002).
232. See FED. R. Civ. P. 24 advisory committee's notes to 1966 Amendments.
233. See Kleissler, 157 F.3d at 971.
234. Kootenai ,313 F.3d at 1108-10.
235. See supranotes 102-04 and accompanying text.
236. Kootenai 11, 313 F.3d at 1109.
237. Id. at 1110.
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interest ' 238 in the litigation and were not so situated that "disposition of
the action may as a practical matter impair or impede" their ability to
protect this interest. 239 In reaching these apparently contradictory
conclusions, the court narrowly distinguished the intervenors'
protectable interest in the implementation of the Roadless Rule from
240
their interest in the rulemaking process itself
This distinction fails to account for the practical effect of a court's
conclusion that the government violated NEPA: a significantly increased
likelihood that it will enjoin the regulation that absentees seek to
defend.2 4' Although the environmental organizations would not be
directly bound by such a judgment, they would face significant practical
barriers in future litigation based on principles of stare decisis. 42 The
Ninth Circuit's approach in Forest Conservation Council of granting
limited intervention of right to an absentee asserting environmental
interests, but excluding the intervenor from the liability phase of the
trial,243 likewise fails to consider the practical effect of a decision on the
merits. A court is not likely to issue an injunction in the remedial phase
of a NEPA challenge unless it has already concluded that the federal
government violated NEPA in the liability phase.244 In Kleissler, the
Third Circuit recognized this concern and rejected the Ninth Circuit's
bifurcated approach of denying intervention in the liability phase of a
NEPA trial while allowing intervention in the remedial phase. The court
concluded that it could not pragmatically apply the Ninth Circuit's
approach without "unduly attenuating" the absentees' protectable
245
interests.

Finally, the Ninth Circuit's federal defendant rule overlooks the effect
on the rulemaking process when the government chooses not to appeal
an adverse judgment. The Ninth Circuit in Didrickson recognized that
the government's acquiescence to an adverse judgment is effectively
equivalent to the promulgation of a regulation reversing the agency's

238. See Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S. 517, 531 (1971).
239. See FED. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2).
240. Kootenai 11, 313 F.3d at 1108.

241. See Kleissler v. United States Forest Serv., 157 F.3d 964, 972 (3d Cir. 1998).
242. See supranotes 91-96 and accompanying text.

243. Forest Conservation Council v. United States Forest Serv., 66 F.3d 1489, 1499 (9th Cir.
1995).
244. See supra notes 91-96 and accompanying text.
245. See supranotes 91-96 and accompanying text.

1094

Rule 24 Intervention in NEPA Litigation

original decision.246 Had the agency directly issued such a regulation,
advocates of the original regulation could have brought suit under the
APA to challenge its decision.247 Yet, under the Kootenai rule, the party
that prevailed in the agency's rulemaking process could be denied the
248
opportunity to join litigation to defend the challenged regulation.
Because the Kootenai decision allows only permissive intervention
under Rule 24(b)(2), the district court could exercise its discretion to
deny intervention to environmental groups seeking to defend the
agency's original decision, 249 regardless of the extent of their
participation in the NEPA rulemaking process or the subject of the
litigation. If the district court denies permissive intervention, an
appellate court is likely to uphold the decision because it reviews such a
denial under the deferential abuse of discretion standard. 250 This
effectively means that the parties that originally prevailed in the
rulemaking process can be shut out of litigation despite their interests in
the implementation of the regulation.
2.

The Ninth Circuit's Use of the FederalDefendant Rule To Deny
Intervention by ConservationGroups Is Inconsistent with the
EnvironmentalPurpose of NEPA

The Kootenai court's application of the federal defendant rule to deny
intervention of right to groups asserting conservation interests conflicts
with NEPA's stated purpose of protecting the environment.25 ' The
Kootenai rule places environmental groups at a distinct practical
disadvantage in future NEPA challenges seeking to overturn
conservation-oriented regulations. Under the Ninth Circuit's federal
defendant rule, once the agency makes a decision, only the side that
opposed that decision is entitled to participate in the liability phase of
NEPA litigation. 252 As a result, the side that successfully persuades an
agency to adopt its preferred regulation does not have an equal
opportunity to participate in future litigation of the matter. The practical
effect of denying intervention to environmental groups is potentially
246. Didrickson v. United States Dep't of the Interior, 982 F.2d 1332, 1339 (9th Cir. 1992).
247. See 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2000).
248. See Kootenai 1, 313 F.3d 1094, 1108 (9th Cir. 2002).
249. See FED. R. Civ. P. 24(b)(2) (providing that a court "may" grant intervention).
250. Greene v. United States, 996 F.2d 973, 978 (9th Cir. 1993).
251. See 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2) (2000); see also supra Part 1.
252. See Kootenai 11, 313 F.3d at 1108.
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quite significant: if the federal government chooses not to defend the
case, a court may invalidate a regulation regardless of whether the
government complied with NEPA.
3.

The Ninth Circuit'sFederalDefendant Rule Conflicts with Its
Otherwise Liberal Grantof Intervention To Defend Challenges
Brought Under Laws Other Than NEPA

The Ninth Circuit's limited rationale for using the federal defendant
rule in NEPA cases is further undermined by the court's refusal to apply
the rule in comparable non-NEPA cases. 253 Notably, the court has not
clearly articulated a distinction between NEPA litigation and other cases
involving procedural or constitutional challenges.254 In Sagebrush
Rebellion, for example, the court granted intervention of right to
conservation groups to defend the federal government's procedures in
establishing a bird conservation area because the groups had participated
in the administrative rulemaking process.2 55 Likewise, in Didrickson,the
Ninth Circuit permitted environmental groups to independently appeal a
decision overturning a wildlife regulation adopted through an APA
rulemaking process because they had actively advocated for the
regulation.256 In addition, the Ninth Circuit has repeatedly allowed
private parties to intervene of right to defend a variety of constitutional
challenges to government actions ranging from ratification procedures
257 to voter initiatives
for a constitutional amendment
to block the import
25
wastes.
of radioactive
As nongovernmental organizations, the intervenors in these cases
could not have violated either the constitutional provisions or the
procedural requirements of the statutes at issue, but the Ninth Circuit

253. See supra Part lIl.A.
254. Compare Sagebrush Rebellion, Inc. v. Watt, 713 F.2d 525, 526-27 (9th Cir. 1983) (granting
intervention of right to defend an administrative decision under the Federal Land Policy and
Management Act), Wash. State Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Spellman, 684 F.2d 627, 630 (9th
Cir. 1982) (granting intervention of right to defend a Commerce Clause challenge to a citizen
initiative), and Idaho v. Freeman, 625 F.2d 886, 887 (9th Cir. 1980) (granting intervention of right
to defend a challenge to the process of adopting a proposed constitutional amendment), with
Kootenai 11, 313 F.3d at 1108 (denying intervention of right because only the federal government
can violate NEPA).
255. Sagebrush Rebellion, 713 F.2d at 526-29.
256. Didrickson v. United States Dep't of the Interior, 982 F.2d 1332, 1338-39 (9th Cir. 1992).
257. Freeman, 625 F.2d at 887.
258. Spellman, 684 F.2d at 630; see supra notes 121-26 and accompanying text.
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granted them intervention of right to defend the federal government's
actions. 259 These grants of intervention in comparable non-NEPA cases
directly contradict the reasoning behind the Ninth Circuit's federal
defendant rule that because only the government can violate the law,
only the government can be a defendant. 260 Applying the federal
defendant rule in NEPA cases directly conflicts with the Ninth Circuit's
granting of intervention to defend procedural and constitutional
challenges when other laws are at issue.261
In Sagebrush Rebellion and related cases, the Ninth Circuit correctly
applied Rule 24 by focusing on the practical effects of the litigation on
the interests of absentees.262 In these cases, the court did not focus on
whether the intervenors could violate the statutes in question, but instead
applied Rule 24 to grant intervention based on the absentees' protectable
interests that would be affected by the outcome of the litigation.
B.

The EnvironmentalIntervenors Were Entitled To Intervene of
Right Because They Asserted Injuries Within NEPA 's Zone of
Interestfor the Environment and ParticipatedDirectly in the
Rulemaking Process

Under a proper application of Rule 24, the Kootenai intervenors
satisfied the requirements for intervention of right. The court expressly
recognized that the intervenors met three of the four requirements of
Rule 24(a)(2): the application was timely, their interests could be
impaired by a decision in the case, and the government did not provide
adequate representation.2 63 The court should have recognized that the
environmental intervenors met the remaining requirement-that of
having a significantly protectable interest-because they asserted
conservation interests in the subject of the litigation that are protected by
NEPA.264 In addition, the intervenors had a protectable interest in
defending the rulemaking process under the court's holding in
Sagebrush Rebellion because they had participated directly in the
adoption of the Roadless Rule.

259. See supra Part II. A.
260. See Kootenai ll, 313 F.3d 1094, 1108 (9th Cir. 2002).
261. See supranotes 121-26 and accompanying text.
262. See supraPart III.A.
263. See Kootenai 11, 313 F.3d at 1108-11.
264. See supra notes 87-89 and accompanying text.
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The Kootenai intervenors asserted interests in the Roadless Rule that
fell within NEPA's zone of concern for the environment and thus
established a protectable interest sufficient to intervene of right under
Rule 24(a)(2).265 When evaluating intervention motions, the court should
consider the purpose of the underlying statute to determine whether it
creates a protectable interest.266 This is particularly appropriate in NEPA
litigation because the APA, which provides the cause of action,26 7
requires plaintiffs to assert an injury within the zone of interest of the
underlying statute. 268 The Ninth Circuit has acknowledged that NEPA's
269
environmental purpose is relevant to evaluating intervention requests.
In Forest Conservation Council, the court granted intervention of right
to the State of Arizona to defend the remedial phase of a NEPA
challenge because the state asserted interests in the environmental health
of its adjacent forests that were "concrete, plausible
interests within
270
NEPA's zone of concern for the environment."
The Ninth Circuit should have recognized that the potential
environmental injuries asserted by the Kootenai intervenors were
likewise within the zone of interest protected by NEPA.27' Instead,
without distinguishing its grant of intervention of right in Forest
Conservation Council, the Kootenai court rejected the proposition that
groups asserting environmental interests can intervene of right to defend
NEPA cases.2 72 The practical effect of denying intervention in this case
would have been the invalidation of a conservation rule protecting vast
tracts of ecologically significant forestland.273 Although environmental
groups would not have been directly bound by res judicata in future
litigation of the issue, stare decisis would pose a significant practical
barrier to relief.274 This change in the regulation would result not from

265. See supra notes 87-89 and accompanying text.

266. See Portland Audubon Soc'y v. Hodel, 866 F.2d 302, 309 (9th Cir. 1989); Stevenson v.
Rominger, 905 F. Supp. 836, 840 (E.D. Wash. 1995); Tobias, supranote 89, at 316.
267. Or. Natural Res. Council Action v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 150 F.3d 1132, 1135 (9th Cir.
1998).
268. Ass'n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970).
269. Forest Conservation Council v. United States Forest Serv., 66 F.3d 1489, 1497 (9th Cir.

1995).
270. Id.
271. See Kootenai 11,
313 F.3d 1094, 1108 (9th Cir. 2002).

272. Id.
273. See id. atI I11 (noting that the federal government declined to defend the Roadless Rule).
274. See supra notes 91-96 and accompanying text.
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the environmentally-informed, public decisionmaking process mandated
by NEPA,275 but instead from a court's decision in a case that was not
defended. Such an outcome would contravene the fundamental purpose
of NEPA.
In addition to having a protectable interest under NEPA, the
environmental intervenors had a separate protectable interest in the
rulemaking process under Sagebrush Rebellion because they directly and
actively promoted the adoption of the Roadless Rule.276 The Ninth
Circuit has repeatedly granted intervention of right to groups to defend
procedural or constitutional challenges to laws they helped to adopt.277
For example, in Sagebrush Rebellion, the court granted intervention of
right to environmental groups that had actively supported the federal
government's establishment of a national conservation area during the
rulemaking process.278 Similarly, in Kootenai, the environmental
279
intervenors actively participated in the NEPA rulemaking process,
encouraging participation by the public that led to submission of more
than 1.15 million comments. 280 Both cases involved a change in
presidential administration that resulted in a dramatically different
approach to conservation policy after the rules were adopted. 28' The only
significant distinction
is that Kootenai is a NEPA case and Sagebrush
282
not.
is
Rebellion
VI. CONCLUSION
The Kootenai decision illustrates that the Ninth Circuit's federal
defendant rule for NEPA cases misapplies Rule 24 by failing to account
for the practical effects of litigation on the protectable interests of
absentees. These interests include environmental concerns protected by
NEPA and participation interests in the administrative rulemaking
process. The Ninth Circuit should abandon its blanket federal defendant

275. See Tillamook County v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 288 F.3d 1140, 1142 (9th
Cir. 2002).
276. See supra Part III.A.
277. See Northwest Forest Res. Council v. Glickman, 82 F.3d 825, 837 (9th Cir. 1996).
278. Sagebrush Rebellion, Inc. v. Watt, 713 F.2d 525, 526 (9th Cir. 1983).
279. See Wyoming v. United States Dep't of Agric., 201 F. Supp. 2d 1151, 1153-54 (D. Wyo.
2002).
280. See Kootenai I, 313 F.3d 1094, 1119 (9th Cir. 2002).
281. Id.; Sagebrush Rebellion, 713 F.2d at 528.
282. Kootenai I, 313 F.3d at 1104; Sagebrush Rebellion, 713 F.2d at 526.
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rule and instead determine whether the absentee asserts a significantly
protectable interest in the subject matter of the litigation that may, as a
practical matter, be impaired by the outcome of the litigation. Applying
this test, the Kootenai intervenors met the requirements to intervene of
right under Rule 24(a)(2) because they asserted environmental interests
protected by NEPA, these interests would be practically impaired by the
outcome of the litigation, and the interests were not adequately
represented by the existing parties.
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